mirror of
https://github.com/django/django.git
synced 2024-12-23 17:46:27 +00:00
55 lines
2.6 KiB
Plaintext
55 lines
2.6 KiB
Plaintext
==========================
|
|
Django 1.7.7 release notes
|
|
==========================
|
|
|
|
*March 18, 2015*
|
|
|
|
Django 1.7.7 fixes several bugs and security issues in 1.7.6.
|
|
|
|
Denial-of-service possibility with ``strip_tags()``
|
|
===================================================
|
|
|
|
Last year :func:`~django.utils.html.strip_tags` was changed to work
|
|
iteratively. The problem is that the size of the input it's processing can
|
|
increase on each iteration which results in an infinite loop in
|
|
``strip_tags()``. This issue only affects versions of Python that haven't
|
|
received :bpo:`a bugfix in HTMLParser <20288>`; namely Python < 2.7.7 and
|
|
3.3.5. Some operating system vendors have also backported the fix for the
|
|
Python bug into their packages of earlier versions.
|
|
|
|
To remedy this issue, ``strip_tags()`` will now return the original input if
|
|
it detects the length of the string it's processing increases. Remember that
|
|
absolutely NO guarantee is provided about the results of ``strip_tags()`` being
|
|
HTML safe. So NEVER mark safe the result of a ``strip_tags()`` call without
|
|
escaping it first, for example with :func:`~django.utils.html.escape`.
|
|
|
|
Mitigated possible XSS attack via user-supplied redirect URLs
|
|
=============================================================
|
|
|
|
Django relies on user input in some cases (e.g.
|
|
``django.contrib.auth.views.login()`` and :doc:`i18n </topics/i18n/index>`)
|
|
to redirect the user to an "on success" URL. The security checks for these
|
|
redirects (namely ``django.utils.http.is_safe_url()``) accepted URLs with
|
|
leading control characters and so considered URLs like ``\x08javascript:...``
|
|
safe. This issue doesn't affect Django currently, since we only put this URL
|
|
into the ``Location`` response header and browsers seem to ignore JavaScript
|
|
there. Browsers we tested also treat URLs prefixed with control characters such
|
|
as ``%08//example.com`` as relative paths so redirection to an unsafe target
|
|
isn't a problem either.
|
|
|
|
However, if a developer relies on ``is_safe_url()`` to
|
|
provide safe redirect targets and puts such a URL into a link, they could
|
|
suffer from an XSS attack as some browsers such as Google Chrome ignore control
|
|
characters at the start of a URL in an anchor ``href``.
|
|
|
|
Bugfixes
|
|
========
|
|
|
|
* Fixed renaming of classes in migrations where renaming a subclass would
|
|
cause incorrect state to be recorded for objects that referenced the
|
|
superclass (:ticket:`24354`).
|
|
|
|
* Stopped writing migration files in dry run mode when merging migration
|
|
conflicts. When ``makemigrations --merge`` is called with ``verbosity=3`` the
|
|
migration file is written to ``stdout`` (:ticket:`24427`).
|