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			238 lines
		
	
	
		
			11 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			Plaintext
		
	
	
	
	
	
| ==================
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| Security in Django
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| ==================
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| 
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| This document is an overview of Django's security features. It includes advice
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| on securing a Django-powered site.
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| 
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| .. _cross-site-scripting:
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| 
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| Cross site scripting (XSS) protection
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| =====================================
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| 
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| .. highlightlang:: html+django
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| 
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| XSS attacks allow a user to inject client side scripts into the browsers of
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| other users. This is usually achieved by storing the malicious scripts in the
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| database where it will be retrieved and displayed to other users, or by getting
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| users to click a link which will cause the attacker's JavaScript to be executed
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| by the user's browser. However, XSS attacks can originate from any untrusted
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| source of data, such as cookies or Web services, whenever the data is not
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| sufficiently sanitized before including in a page.
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| 
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| Using Django templates protects you against the majority of XSS attacks.
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| However, it is important to understand what protections it provides
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| and its limitations.
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| 
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| Django templates :ref:`escape specific characters <automatic-html-escaping>`
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| which are particularly dangerous to HTML. While this protects users from most
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| malicious input, it is not entirely foolproof. For example, it will not
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| protect the following:
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| 
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| .. code-block:: html+django
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| 
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|     <style class={{ var }}>...</style>
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| 
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| If ``var`` is set to ``'class1 onmouseover=javascript:func()'``, this can result
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| in unauthorized JavaScript execution, depending on how the browser renders
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| imperfect HTML.
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| 
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| It is also important to be particularly careful when using ``is_safe`` with
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| custom template tags, the :tfilter:`safe` template tag, :mod:`mark_safe
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| <django.utils.safestring>`, and when autoescape is turned off.
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| 
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| In addition, if you are using the template system to output something other
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| than HTML, there may be entirely separate characters and words which require
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| escaping.
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| 
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| You should also be very careful when storing HTML in the database, especially
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| when that HTML is retrieved and displayed.
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| 
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| Markup library
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| --------------
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| 
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| If you use :mod:`django.contrib.markup`, you need to ensure that the filters are
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| only used on trusted input, or that you have correctly configured them to ensure
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| they do not allow raw HTML output. See the documentation of that module for more
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| information.
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| 
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| Cross site request forgery (CSRF) protection
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| ============================================
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| 
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| CSRF attacks allow a malicious user to execute actions using the credentials
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| of another user without that user's knowledge or consent.
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| 
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| Django has built-in protection against most types of CSRF attacks, providing you
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| have :ref:`enabled and used it <using-csrf>` where appropriate. However, as with
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| any mitigation technique, there are limitations. For example, it is possible to
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| disable the CSRF module globally or for particular views. You should only do
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| this if you know what you are doing. There are other :ref:`limitations
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| <csrf-limitations>` if your site has subdomains that are outside of your
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| control.
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| 
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| :ref:`CSRF protection works <how-csrf-works>` by checking for a nonce in each
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| POST request. This ensures that a malicious user cannot simply "replay" a form
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| POST to your Web site and have another logged in user unwittingly submit that
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| form. The malicious user would have to know the nonce, which is user specific
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| (using a cookie).
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| 
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| When deployed with :ref:`HTTPS <security-recommendation-ssl>`,
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| ``CsrfViewMiddleware`` will check that the HTTP referer header is set to a
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| URL on the same origin (including subdomain and port). Because HTTPS
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| provides additional security, it is imperative to ensure connections use HTTPS
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| where it is available by forwarding insecure connection requests and using
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| HSTS for supported browsers.
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| 
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| Be very careful with marking views with the ``csrf_exempt`` decorator unless
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| it is absolutely necessary.
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| 
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| 
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| SQL injection protection
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| ========================
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| 
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| SQL injection is a type of attack where a malicious user is able to execute
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| arbitrary SQL code on a database. This can result in records
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| being deleted or data leakage.
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| 
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| By using Django's querysets, the resulting SQL will be properly escaped by
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| the underlying database driver. However, Django also gives developers power to
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| write :ref:`raw queries <executing-raw-queries>` or execute
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| :ref:`custom sql <executing-custom-sql>`. These capabilities should be used
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| sparingly and you should always be careful to properly escape any parameters
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| that the user can control. In addition, you should exercise caution when using
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| :meth:`extra() <django.db.models.query.QuerySet.extra>`.
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| 
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| Clickjacking protection
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| =======================
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| 
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| Clickjacking is a type of attack where a malicious site wraps another site
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| in a frame. This attack can result in an unsuspecting user being tricked
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| into performing unintended actions on the target site.
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| 
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| Django contains :ref:`clickjacking protection <clickjacking-prevention>` in
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| the form of the
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| :mod:`X-Frame-Options middleware <django.middleware.clickjacking.XFrameOptionsMiddleware>`
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| which in a supporting browser can prevent a site from being rendered inside
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| a frame. It is possible to disable the protection on a per view basis
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| or to configure the exact header value sent.
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| 
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| The middleware is strongly recommended for any site that does not need to have
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| its pages wrapped in a frame by third party sites, or only needs to allow that
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| for a small section of the site.
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| 
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| .. _security-recommendation-ssl:
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| 
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| SSL/HTTPS
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| =========
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| 
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| It is always better for security, though not always practical in all cases, to
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| deploy your site behind HTTPS. Without this, it is possible for malicious
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| network users to sniff authentication credentials or any other information
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| transferred between client and server, and in some cases -- **active** network
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| attackers -- to alter data that is sent in either direction.
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| 
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| If you want the protection that HTTPS provides, and have enabled it on your
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| server, there are some additional steps you may need:
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| 
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| * If necessary, set :setting:`SECURE_PROXY_SSL_HEADER`, ensuring that you have
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|   understood the warnings there thoroughly. Failure to do this can result
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|   in CSRF vulnerabilities, and failure to do it correctly can also be
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|   dangerous!
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| 
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| * Set up redirection so that requests over HTTP are redirected to HTTPS.
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| 
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|   This could be done using a custom middleware. Please note the caveats under
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|   :setting:`SECURE_PROXY_SSL_HEADER`. For the case of a reverse proxy, it may be
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|   easier or more secure to configure the main Web server to do the redirect to
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|   HTTPS.
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| 
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| * Use 'secure' cookies.
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| 
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|   If a browser connects initially via HTTP, which is the default for most
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|   browsers, it is possible for existing cookies to be leaked. For this reason,
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|   you should set your :setting:`SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE` and
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|   :setting:`CSRF_COOKIE_SECURE` settings to ``True``. This instructs the browser
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|   to only send these cookies over HTTPS connections. Note that this will mean
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|   that sessions will not work over HTTP, and the CSRF protection will prevent
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|   any POST data being accepted over HTTP (which will be fine if you are
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|   redirecting all HTTP traffic to HTTPS).
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| 
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| * Use HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)
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| 
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|   HSTS is an HTTP header that informs a browser that all future connections
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|   to a particular site should always use HTTPS. Combined with redirecting
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|   requests over HTTP to HTTPS, this will ensure that connections always enjoy
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|   the added security of SSL provided one successful connection has occurred.
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|   HSTS is usually configured on the web server.
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| 
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| .. _host-headers-virtual-hosting:
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| 
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| Host header validation
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| ======================
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| 
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| Django uses the ``Host`` header provided by the client to construct URLs in
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| certain cases. While these values are sanitized to prevent Cross Site Scripting
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| attacks, a fake ``Host`` value can be used for Cross-Site Request Forgery,
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| cache poisoning attacks, and poisoning links in emails.
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| 
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| Because even seemingly-secure webserver configurations are susceptible to fake
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| ``Host`` headers, Django validates ``Host`` headers against the
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| :setting:`ALLOWED_HOSTS` setting in the
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| :meth:`django.http.HttpRequest.get_host()` method.
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| 
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| This validation only applies via :meth:`~django.http.HttpRequest.get_host()`;
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| if your code accesses the ``Host`` header directly from ``request.META`` you
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| are bypassing this security protection.
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| 
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| For more details see the full :setting:`ALLOWED_HOSTS` documentation.
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| 
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| .. warning::
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| 
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|    Previous versions of this document recommended configuring your webserver to
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|    ensure it validates incoming HTTP ``Host`` headers. While this is still
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|    recommended, in many common webservers a configuration that seems to
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|    validate the ``Host`` header may not in fact do so. For instance, even if
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|    Apache is configured such that your Django site is served from a non-default
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|    virtual host with the ``ServerName`` set, it is still possible for an HTTP
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|    request to match this virtual host and supply a fake ``Host`` header. Thus,
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|    Django now requires that you set :setting:`ALLOWED_HOSTS` explicitly rather
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|    than relying on webserver configuration.
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| 
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| Additionally, as of 1.3.1, Django requires you to explicitly enable support for
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| the ``X-Forwarded-Host`` header (via the :setting:`USE_X_FORWARDED_HOST`
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| setting) if your configuration requires it.
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| 
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| Session security
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| ================
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| 
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| Similar to the :ref:`CSRF limitations <csrf-limitations>` requiring a site to
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| be deployed such that untrusted users don't have access to any subdomains,
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| :mod:`django.contrib.sessions` also has limitations. See :ref:`the session
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| topic guide section on security <topics-session-security>` for details.
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| 
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| .. _additional-security-topics:
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| 
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| Additional security topics
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| ==========================
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| 
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| While Django provides good security protection out of the box, it is still
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| important to properly deploy your application and take advantage of the
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| security protection of the Web server, operating system and other components.
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| 
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| * Make sure that your Python code is outside of the Web server's root. This
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|   will ensure that your Python code is not accidentally served as plain text
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|   (or accidentally executed).
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| * Take care with any :ref:`user uploaded files <file-upload-security>`.
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| * Django does not throttle requests to authenticate users. To protect against
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|   brute-force attacks against the authentication system, you may consider
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|   deploying a Django plugin or Web server module to throttle these requests.
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| * If your site accepts file uploads, it is strongly advised that you limit
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|   these uploads in your Web server configuration to a reasonable
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|   size in order to prevent denial of service (DOS) attacks. In Apache, this
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|   can be easily set using the LimitRequestBody_ directive.
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| * Keep your :setting:`SECRET_KEY` a secret.
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| * It is a good idea to limit the accessibility of your caching system and
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|   database using a firewall.
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| 
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| .. _LimitRequestBody: http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.2/mod/core.html#limitrequestbody
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