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38 lines
1.5 KiB
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38 lines
1.5 KiB
Plaintext
==========================
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Django 1.3.4 release notes
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==========================
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*October 17, 2012*
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This is the fourth release in the Django 1.3 series.
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Host header poisoning
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=====================
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Some parts of Django -- independent of end-user-written applications -- make
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use of full URLs, including domain name, which are generated from the HTTP Host
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header. Some attacks against this are beyond Django's ability to control, and
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require the web server to be properly configured; Django's documentation has
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for some time contained notes advising users on such configuration.
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Django's own built-in parsing of the Host header is, however, still vulnerable,
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as was reported to us recently. The Host header parsing in Django 1.3.3 and
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Django 1.4.1 -- specifically, ``django.http.HttpRequest.get_host()`` -- was
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incorrectly handling username/password information in the header. Thus, for
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example, the following Host header would be accepted by Django when running on
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"validsite.com"::
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Host: validsite.com:random@evilsite.com
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Using this, an attacker can cause parts of Django -- particularly the
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password-reset mechanism -- to generate and display arbitrary URLs to users.
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To remedy this, the parsing in ``HttpRequest.get_host()`` is being modified;
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Host headers which contain potentially dangerous content (such as
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username/password pairs) now raise the exception
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:exc:`django.core.exceptions.SuspiciousOperation`.
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Details of this issue were initially posted online as a `security advisory`_.
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.. _security advisory: https://www.djangoproject.com/weblog/2012/oct/17/security/
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