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285 lines
12 KiB
Plaintext
285 lines
12 KiB
Plaintext
=====================================
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Cross Site Request Forgery protection
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=====================================
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.. module:: django.middleware.csrf
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:synopsis: Protects against Cross Site Request Forgeries
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The CSRF middleware and template tag provides easy-to-use protection against
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`Cross Site Request Forgeries`_. This type of attack occurs when a malicious
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Web site contains a link, a form button or some javascript that is intended to
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perform some action on your Web site, using the credentials of a logged-in user
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who visits the malicious site in their browser. A related type of attack,
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'login CSRF', where an attacking site tricks a user's browser into logging into
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a site with someone else's credentials, is also covered.
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The first defense against CSRF attacks is to ensure that GET requests are
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side-effect free. POST requests can then be protected by following the steps
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below.
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.. _Cross Site Request Forgeries: http://www.squarefree.com/securitytips/web-developers.html#CSRF
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How to use it
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=============
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To enable CSRF protection for your views, follow these steps:
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1. Add the middleware
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``'django.middleware.csrf.CsrfViewMiddleware'`` to your list of
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middleware classes, :setting:`MIDDLEWARE_CLASSES`. (It should come
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and before any view middleware that assume that CSRF attacks have
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been dealt with.)
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Alternatively, you can use the decorator
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``django.views.decorators.csrf.csrf_protect`` on particular views you
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want to protect (see below).
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2. In any template that uses a POST form, use the :ttag:`csrf_token` tag inside
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the ``<form>`` element if the form is for an internal URL, e.g.::
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<form action="." method="post">{% csrf_token %}
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This should not be done for POST forms that target external URLs, since
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that would cause the CSRF token to be leaked, leading to a vulnerability.
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3. In the corresponding view functions, ensure that the
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``'django.core.context_processors.csrf'`` context processor is
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being used. Usually, this can be done in one of two ways:
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1. Use RequestContext, which always uses
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``'django.core.context_processors.csrf'`` (no matter what your
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TEMPLATE_CONTEXT_PROCESSORS setting). If you are using
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generic views or contrib apps, you are covered already, since these
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apps use RequestContext throughout.
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2. Manually import and use the processor to generate the CSRF token and
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add it to the template context. e.g.::
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from django.core.context_processors import csrf
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from django.shortcuts import render_to_response
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def my_view(request):
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c = {}
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c.update(csrf(request))
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# ... view code here
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return render_to_response("a_template.html", c)
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You may want to write your own ``render_to_response`` wrapper that
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takes care of this step for you.
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The utility script ``extras/csrf_migration_helper.py`` can help to automate the
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finding of code and templates that may need these steps. It contains full help
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on how to use it.
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.. _csrf-ajax:
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AJAX
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----
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While the above method can be used for AJAX POST requests, it has some
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inconveniences: you have to remember to pass the CSRF token in as POST data with
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every POST request. For this reason, there is an alternative method: on each
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XMLHttpRequest, set a custom `X-CSRFToken` header to the value of the CSRF
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token. This is often easier, because many javascript frameworks provide hooks
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that allow headers to be set on every request. In jQuery, you can use the
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``ajaxSend`` event as follows:
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.. code-block:: javascript
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$('html').ajaxSend(function(event, xhr, settings) {
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function getCookie(name) {
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var cookieValue = null;
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if (document.cookie && document.cookie != '') {
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var cookies = document.cookie.split(';');
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for (var i = 0; i < cookies.length; i++) {
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var cookie = jQuery.trim(cookies[i]);
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// Does this cookie string begin with the name we want?
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if (cookie.substring(0, name.length + 1) == (name + '=')) {
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cookieValue = decodeURIComponent(cookie.substring(name.length + 1));
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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return cookieValue;
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}
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if (!(/^http:.*/.test(settings.url) || /^https:.*/.test(settings.url))) {
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// Only send the token to relative URLs i.e. locally.
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xhr.setRequestHeader("X-CSRFToken", getCookie('csrftoken'));
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}
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});
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Adding this to a javascript file that is included on your site will ensure that
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AJAX POST requests that are made via jQuery will not be caught by the CSRF
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protection.
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The decorator method
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--------------------
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Rather than adding ``CsrfViewMiddleware`` as a blanket protection, you can use
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the ``csrf_protect`` decorator, which has exactly the same functionality, on
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particular views that need the protection. It must be used **both** on views
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that insert the CSRF token in the output, and on those that accept the POST form
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data. (These are often the same view function, but not always). It is used like
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this::
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from django.views.decorators.csrf import csrf_protect
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from django.template import RequestContext
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@csrf_protect
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def my_view(request):
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c = {}
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# ...
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return render_to_response("a_template.html", c,
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context_instance=RequestContext(request))
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Use of the decorator is **not recommended** by itself, since if you forget to
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use it, you will have a security hole. The 'belt and braces' strategy of using
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both is fine, and will incur minimal overhead.
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Exceptions
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----------
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To manually exclude a view function from being handled by either of the two CSRF
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middleware, you can use the ``csrf_exempt`` decorator, found in the
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``django.views.decorators.csrf`` module. For example::
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from django.views.decorators.csrf import csrf_exempt
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@csrf_exempt
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def my_view(request):
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return HttpResponse('Hello world')
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Subdomains
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----------
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By default, CSRF cookies are specific to the subdomain they are set for. This
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means that a form served from one subdomain (e.g. server1.example.com) will not
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be able to have a target on another subdomain (e.g. server2.example.com). This
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restriction can be removed by setting :setting:`CSRF_COOKIE_DOMAIN` to be
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something like ``".example.com"``.
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Please note that, with or without use of this setting, this CSRF protection
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mechanism is not safe against cross-subdomain attacks -- see `Limitations`_.
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Rejected requests
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=================
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By default, a '403 Forbidden' response is sent to the user if an incoming
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request fails the checks performed by ``CsrfViewMiddleware``. This should
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usually only be seen when there is a genuine Cross Site Request Forgery, or
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when, due to a programming error, the CSRF token has not been included with a
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POST form.
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The error page, however, is not very friendly, so you may want to provide your
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own view for handling this condition. To do this, simply set the
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:setting:`CSRF_FAILURE_VIEW` setting to a dotted path to your own view function,
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which should have the following signature::
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def csrf_failure(request, reason="")
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where ``reason`` is a short message (intended for developers or logging, not for
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end users) indicating the reason the request was rejected.
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How it works
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============
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The CSRF protection is based on the following things:
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1. A CSRF cookie that is set to a random value (a session independent nonce, as
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it is called), which other sites will not have access to.
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This cookie is set by ``CsrfViewMiddleware``. It is meant to be permanent,
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but since there is no way to set a cookie that never expires, it is sent with
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every response that has called ``django.middleware.csrf.get_token()``
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(the function used internally to retrieve the CSRF token).
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2. A hidden form field with the name 'csrfmiddlewaretoken' present in all
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outgoing POST forms. The value of this field is the value of the CSRF
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cookie.
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This part is done by the template tag.
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3. For all incoming POST requests, a CSRF cookie must be present, and the
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'csrfmiddlewaretoken' field must be present and correct. If it isn't, the
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user will get a 403 error.
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This check is done by ``CsrfViewMiddleware``.
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4. In addition, for HTTPS requests, strict referer checking is done by
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``CsrfViewMiddleware``. This is necessary to address a Man-In-The-Middle
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attack that is possible under HTTPS when using a session independent nonce,
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due to the fact that HTTP 'Set-Cookie' headers are (unfortunately) accepted
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by clients that are talking to a site under HTTPS. (Referer checking is not
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done for HTTP requests because the presence of the Referer header is not
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reliable enough under HTTP.)
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This ensures that only forms that have originated from your Web site can be used
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to POST data back.
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It deliberately only targets HTTP POST requests (and the corresponding POST
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forms). GET requests ought never to have any potentially dangerous side effects
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(see `9.1.1 Safe Methods, HTTP 1.1, RFC 2616`_), and so a CSRF attack with a GET
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request ought to be harmless.
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.. _9.1.1 Safe Methods, HTTP 1.1, RFC 2616: http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec9.html
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Caching
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=======
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If the :ttag:`csrf_token` template tag is used by a template (or the
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``get_token`` function is called some other way), ``CsrfViewMiddleware`` will
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add a cookie and a ``Vary: Cookie`` header to the response. This means that the
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middleware will play well with the cache middleware if it is used as instructed
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(``UpdateCacheMiddleware`` goes before all other middleware).
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However, if you use cache decorators on individual views, the CSRF middleware
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will not yet have been able to set the Vary header. In this case, on any views
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that will require a CSRF token to be inserted you should use the
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:func:`django.views.decorators.vary.vary_on_cookie` decorator first::
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from django.views.decorators.cache import cache_page
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from django.views.decorators.vary import vary_on_cookie
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@cache_page(60 * 15)
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@vary_on_cookie
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def my_view(request):
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# ...
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Testing
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=======
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The ``CsrfViewMiddleware`` will usually be a big hindrance to testing view
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functions, due to the need for the CSRF token which must be sent with every POST
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request. For this reason, Django's HTTP client for tests has been modified to
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set a flag on requests which relaxes the middleware and the ``csrf_protect``
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decorator so that they no longer rejects requests. In every other respect
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(e.g. sending cookies etc.), they behave the same.
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If, for some reason, you *want* the test client to perform CSRF
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checks, you can create an instance of the test client that enforces
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CSRF checks::
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>>> from django.test import Client
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>>> csrf_client = Client(enforce_csrf_checks=True)
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Limitations
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===========
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Subdomains within a site will be able to set cookies on the client for the whole
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domain. By setting the cookie and using a corresponding token, subdomains will
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be able to circumvent the CSRF protection. The only way to avoid this is to
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ensure that subdomains are controlled by trusted users (or, are at least unable
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to set cookies). Note that even without CSRF, there are other vulnerabilities,
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such as session fixation, that make giving subdomains to untrusted parties a bad
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idea, and these vulnerabilities cannot easily be fixed with current browsers.
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Contrib and reusable apps
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=========================
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Because it is possible for the developer to turn off the ``CsrfViewMiddleware``,
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all relevant views in contrib apps use the ``csrf_protect`` decorator to ensure
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the security of these applications against CSRF. It is recommended that the
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developers of other reusable apps that want the same guarantees also use the
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``csrf_protect`` decorator on their views.
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