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			1494 lines
		
	
	
		
			57 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			Python
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			1494 lines
		
	
	
		
			57 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			Python
		
	
	
	
	
	
| import logging
 | |
| import re
 | |
| 
 | |
| from django.conf import settings
 | |
| from django.contrib.sessions.backends.cache import SessionStore
 | |
| from django.core.exceptions import ImproperlyConfigured
 | |
| from django.http import HttpRequest, HttpResponse, UnreadablePostError
 | |
| from django.middleware.csrf import (
 | |
|     CSRF_ALLOWED_CHARS,
 | |
|     CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH,
 | |
|     CSRF_SESSION_KEY,
 | |
|     CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH,
 | |
|     REASON_BAD_ORIGIN,
 | |
|     REASON_CSRF_TOKEN_MISSING,
 | |
|     REASON_NO_CSRF_COOKIE,
 | |
|     CsrfViewMiddleware,
 | |
|     InvalidTokenFormat,
 | |
|     RejectRequest,
 | |
|     _check_token_format,
 | |
|     _does_token_match,
 | |
|     _mask_cipher_secret,
 | |
|     _unmask_cipher_token,
 | |
|     get_token,
 | |
|     rotate_token,
 | |
| )
 | |
| from django.test import SimpleTestCase, override_settings
 | |
| from django.views.decorators.csrf import csrf_exempt, requires_csrf_token
 | |
| 
 | |
| from .views import (
 | |
|     ensure_csrf_cookie_view,
 | |
|     ensured_and_protected_view,
 | |
|     non_token_view_using_request_processor,
 | |
|     post_form_view,
 | |
|     protected_view,
 | |
|     sandwiched_rotate_token_view,
 | |
|     token_view,
 | |
| )
 | |
| 
 | |
| # This is a test (unmasked) CSRF cookie / secret.
 | |
| TEST_SECRET = "lcccccccX2kcccccccY2jcccccccssIC"
 | |
| # Two masked versions of TEST_SECRET for testing purposes.
 | |
| MASKED_TEST_SECRET1 = "1bcdefghij2bcdefghij3bcdefghij4bcdefghij5bcdefghij6bcdefghijABCD"
 | |
| MASKED_TEST_SECRET2 = "2JgchWvM1tpxT2lfz9aydoXW9yT1DN3NdLiejYxOOlzzV4nhBbYqmqZYbAV3V5Bf"
 | |
| 
 | |
| 
 | |
| class CsrfFunctionTestMixin:
 | |
|     # This method depends on _unmask_cipher_token() being correct.
 | |
|     def assertMaskedSecretCorrect(self, masked_secret, secret):
 | |
|         """Test that a string is a valid masked version of a secret."""
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(len(masked_secret), CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH)
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(len(secret), CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH)
 | |
|         self.assertTrue(
 | |
|             set(masked_secret).issubset(set(CSRF_ALLOWED_CHARS)),
 | |
|             msg=f"invalid characters in {masked_secret!r}",
 | |
|         )
 | |
|         actual = _unmask_cipher_token(masked_secret)
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(actual, secret)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def assertForbiddenReason(
 | |
|         self, response, logger_cm, reason, levelno=logging.WARNING
 | |
|     ):
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(
 | |
|             records_len := len(logger_cm.records),
 | |
|             1,
 | |
|             f"Unexpected number of records for {logger_cm=} in {levelno=} (expected 1, "
 | |
|             f"got {records_len}).",
 | |
|         )
 | |
|         record = logger_cm.records[0]
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(record.getMessage(), "Forbidden (%s): " % reason)
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(record.levelno, levelno)
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(record.status_code, 403)
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)
 | |
| 
 | |
| 
 | |
| class CsrfFunctionTests(CsrfFunctionTestMixin, SimpleTestCase):
 | |
|     def test_unmask_cipher_token(self):
 | |
|         cases = [
 | |
|             (TEST_SECRET, MASKED_TEST_SECRET1),
 | |
|             (TEST_SECRET, MASKED_TEST_SECRET2),
 | |
|             (
 | |
|                 32 * "a",
 | |
|                 "vFioG3XOLyGyGsPRFyB9iYUs341ufzIEvFioG3XOLyGyGsPRFyB9iYUs341ufzIE",
 | |
|             ),
 | |
|             (32 * "a", 64 * "a"),
 | |
|             (32 * "a", 64 * "b"),
 | |
|             (32 * "b", 32 * "a" + 32 * "b"),
 | |
|             (32 * "b", 32 * "b" + 32 * "c"),
 | |
|             (32 * "c", 32 * "a" + 32 * "c"),
 | |
|         ]
 | |
|         for secret, masked_secret in cases:
 | |
|             with self.subTest(masked_secret=masked_secret):
 | |
|                 actual = _unmask_cipher_token(masked_secret)
 | |
|                 self.assertEqual(actual, secret)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_mask_cipher_secret(self):
 | |
|         cases = [
 | |
|             32 * "a",
 | |
|             TEST_SECRET,
 | |
|             "da4SrUiHJYoJ0HYQ0vcgisoIuFOxx4ER",
 | |
|         ]
 | |
|         for secret in cases:
 | |
|             with self.subTest(secret=secret):
 | |
|                 masked = _mask_cipher_secret(secret)
 | |
|                 self.assertMaskedSecretCorrect(masked, secret)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_get_token_csrf_cookie_set(self):
 | |
|         request = HttpRequest()
 | |
|         request.META["CSRF_COOKIE"] = TEST_SECRET
 | |
|         self.assertNotIn("CSRF_COOKIE_NEEDS_UPDATE", request.META)
 | |
|         token = get_token(request)
 | |
|         self.assertMaskedSecretCorrect(token, TEST_SECRET)
 | |
|         # The existing cookie is preserved.
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(request.META["CSRF_COOKIE"], TEST_SECRET)
 | |
|         self.assertIs(request.META["CSRF_COOKIE_NEEDS_UPDATE"], True)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_get_token_csrf_cookie_not_set(self):
 | |
|         request = HttpRequest()
 | |
|         self.assertNotIn("CSRF_COOKIE", request.META)
 | |
|         self.assertNotIn("CSRF_COOKIE_NEEDS_UPDATE", request.META)
 | |
|         token = get_token(request)
 | |
|         cookie = request.META["CSRF_COOKIE"]
 | |
|         self.assertMaskedSecretCorrect(token, cookie)
 | |
|         self.assertIs(request.META["CSRF_COOKIE_NEEDS_UPDATE"], True)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_rotate_token(self):
 | |
|         request = HttpRequest()
 | |
|         request.META["CSRF_COOKIE"] = TEST_SECRET
 | |
|         self.assertNotIn("CSRF_COOKIE_NEEDS_UPDATE", request.META)
 | |
|         rotate_token(request)
 | |
|         # The underlying secret was changed.
 | |
|         cookie = request.META["CSRF_COOKIE"]
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(len(cookie), CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH)
 | |
|         self.assertNotEqual(cookie, TEST_SECRET)
 | |
|         self.assertIs(request.META["CSRF_COOKIE_NEEDS_UPDATE"], True)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_check_token_format_valid(self):
 | |
|         cases = [
 | |
|             # A token of length CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH.
 | |
|             TEST_SECRET,
 | |
|             # A token of length CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH.
 | |
|             MASKED_TEST_SECRET1,
 | |
|             64 * "a",
 | |
|         ]
 | |
|         for token in cases:
 | |
|             with self.subTest(token=token):
 | |
|                 actual = _check_token_format(token)
 | |
|                 self.assertIsNone(actual)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_check_token_format_invalid(self):
 | |
|         cases = [
 | |
|             (64 * "*", "has invalid characters"),
 | |
|             (16 * "a", "has incorrect length"),
 | |
|         ]
 | |
|         for token, expected_message in cases:
 | |
|             with self.subTest(token=token):
 | |
|                 with self.assertRaisesMessage(InvalidTokenFormat, expected_message):
 | |
|                     _check_token_format(token)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_does_token_match(self):
 | |
|         cases = [
 | |
|             # Masked tokens match.
 | |
|             ((MASKED_TEST_SECRET1, TEST_SECRET), True),
 | |
|             ((MASKED_TEST_SECRET2, TEST_SECRET), True),
 | |
|             ((64 * "a", _unmask_cipher_token(64 * "a")), True),
 | |
|             # Unmasked tokens match.
 | |
|             ((TEST_SECRET, TEST_SECRET), True),
 | |
|             ((32 * "a", 32 * "a"), True),
 | |
|             # Incorrect tokens don't match.
 | |
|             ((32 * "a", TEST_SECRET), False),
 | |
|             ((64 * "a", TEST_SECRET), False),
 | |
|         ]
 | |
|         for (token, secret), expected in cases:
 | |
|             with self.subTest(token=token, secret=secret):
 | |
|                 actual = _does_token_match(token, secret)
 | |
|                 self.assertIs(actual, expected)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_does_token_match_wrong_token_length(self):
 | |
|         with self.assertRaises(AssertionError):
 | |
|             _does_token_match(16 * "a", TEST_SECRET)
 | |
| 
 | |
| 
 | |
| class TestingSessionStore(SessionStore):
 | |
|     """
 | |
|     A version of SessionStore that stores what cookie values are passed to
 | |
|     set_cookie() when CSRF_USE_SESSIONS=True.
 | |
|     """
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
 | |
|         super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
 | |
|         # This is a list of the cookie values passed to set_cookie() over
 | |
|         # the course of the request-response.
 | |
|         self._cookies_set = []
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def __setitem__(self, key, value):
 | |
|         super().__setitem__(key, value)
 | |
|         self._cookies_set.append(value)
 | |
| 
 | |
| 
 | |
| class TestingHttpRequest(HttpRequest):
 | |
|     """
 | |
|     A version of HttpRequest that lets one track and change some things more
 | |
|     easily.
 | |
|     """
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def __init__(self):
 | |
|         super().__init__()
 | |
|         self.session = TestingSessionStore()
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def is_secure(self):
 | |
|         return getattr(self, "_is_secure_override", False)
 | |
| 
 | |
| 
 | |
| class PostErrorRequest(TestingHttpRequest):
 | |
|     """
 | |
|     TestingHttpRequest that can raise errors when accessing POST data.
 | |
|     """
 | |
| 
 | |
|     post_error = None
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _get_post(self):
 | |
|         if self.post_error is not None:
 | |
|             raise self.post_error
 | |
|         return self._post
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _set_post(self, post):
 | |
|         self._post = post
 | |
| 
 | |
|     POST = property(_get_post, _set_post)
 | |
| 
 | |
| 
 | |
| class CsrfViewMiddlewareTestMixin(CsrfFunctionTestMixin):
 | |
|     """
 | |
|     Shared methods and tests for session-based and cookie-based tokens.
 | |
|     """
 | |
| 
 | |
|     _csrf_id_cookie = MASKED_TEST_SECRET1
 | |
|     _csrf_id_token = MASKED_TEST_SECRET2
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _set_csrf_cookie(self, req, cookie):
 | |
|         raise NotImplementedError("This method must be implemented by a subclass.")
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _read_csrf_cookie(self, req, resp):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         Return the CSRF cookie as a string, or False if no cookie is present.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         raise NotImplementedError("This method must be implemented by a subclass.")
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _get_cookies_set(self, req, resp):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         Return a list of the cookie values passed to set_cookie() over the
 | |
|         course of the request-response.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         raise NotImplementedError("This method must be implemented by a subclass.")
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _get_request(self, method=None, cookie=None, request_class=None):
 | |
|         if method is None:
 | |
|             method = "GET"
 | |
|         if request_class is None:
 | |
|             request_class = TestingHttpRequest
 | |
|         req = request_class()
 | |
|         req.method = method
 | |
|         if cookie is not None:
 | |
|             self._set_csrf_cookie(req, cookie)
 | |
|         return req
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _get_csrf_cookie_request(
 | |
|         self,
 | |
|         method=None,
 | |
|         cookie=None,
 | |
|         post_token=None,
 | |
|         meta_token=None,
 | |
|         token_header=None,
 | |
|         request_class=None,
 | |
|     ):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         The method argument defaults to "GET". The cookie argument defaults to
 | |
|         this class's default test cookie. The post_token and meta_token
 | |
|         arguments are included in the request's req.POST and req.META headers,
 | |
|         respectively, when that argument is provided and non-None. The
 | |
|         token_header argument is the header key to use for req.META, defaults
 | |
|         to "HTTP_X_CSRFTOKEN".
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         if cookie is None:
 | |
|             cookie = self._csrf_id_cookie
 | |
|         if token_header is None:
 | |
|             token_header = "HTTP_X_CSRFTOKEN"
 | |
|         req = self._get_request(
 | |
|             method=method,
 | |
|             cookie=cookie,
 | |
|             request_class=request_class,
 | |
|         )
 | |
|         if post_token is not None:
 | |
|             req.POST["csrfmiddlewaretoken"] = post_token
 | |
|         if meta_token is not None:
 | |
|             req.META[token_header] = meta_token
 | |
|         return req
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _get_POST_csrf_cookie_request(
 | |
|         self,
 | |
|         cookie=None,
 | |
|         post_token=None,
 | |
|         meta_token=None,
 | |
|         token_header=None,
 | |
|         request_class=None,
 | |
|     ):
 | |
|         return self._get_csrf_cookie_request(
 | |
|             method="POST",
 | |
|             cookie=cookie,
 | |
|             post_token=post_token,
 | |
|             meta_token=meta_token,
 | |
|             token_header=token_header,
 | |
|             request_class=request_class,
 | |
|         )
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _get_POST_request_with_token(self, cookie=None, request_class=None):
 | |
|         """The cookie argument defaults to this class's default test cookie."""
 | |
|         return self._get_POST_csrf_cookie_request(
 | |
|             cookie=cookie,
 | |
|             post_token=self._csrf_id_token,
 | |
|             request_class=request_class,
 | |
|         )
 | |
| 
 | |
|     # This method depends on _unmask_cipher_token() being correct.
 | |
|     def _check_token_present(self, response, csrf_secret=None):
 | |
|         if csrf_secret is None:
 | |
|             csrf_secret = TEST_SECRET
 | |
|         text = str(response.content, response.charset)
 | |
|         match = re.search('name="csrfmiddlewaretoken" value="(.*?)"', text)
 | |
|         self.assertTrue(
 | |
|             match,
 | |
|             f"Could not find a csrfmiddlewaretoken value in: {text}",
 | |
|         )
 | |
|         csrf_token = match[1]
 | |
|         self.assertMaskedSecretCorrect(csrf_token, csrf_secret)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_process_response_get_token_not_used(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         If get_token() is not called, the view middleware does not
 | |
|         add a cookie.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         # This is important to make pages cacheable. Pages which do call
 | |
|         # get_token(), assuming they use the token, are not cacheable because
 | |
|         # the token is specific to the user
 | |
|         req = self._get_request()
 | |
|         # non_token_view_using_request_processor does not call get_token(), but
 | |
|         # does use the csrf request processor. By using this, we are testing
 | |
|         # that the view processor is properly lazy and doesn't call get_token()
 | |
|         # until needed.
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(non_token_view_using_request_processor)
 | |
|         mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|         mw.process_view(req, non_token_view_using_request_processor, (), {})
 | |
|         resp = mw(req)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         csrf_cookie = self._read_csrf_cookie(req, resp)
 | |
|         self.assertIs(csrf_cookie, False)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _check_bad_or_missing_cookie(self, cookie, expected):
 | |
|         """Passing None for cookie includes no cookie."""
 | |
|         req = self._get_request(method="POST", cookie=cookie)
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|         with self.assertLogs("django.security.csrf", "WARNING") as cm:
 | |
|             resp = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertForbiddenReason(resp, cm, expected)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_no_csrf_cookie(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         If no CSRF cookies is present, the middleware rejects the incoming
 | |
|         request. This will stop login CSRF.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         self._check_bad_or_missing_cookie(None, REASON_NO_CSRF_COOKIE)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _check_bad_or_missing_token(
 | |
|         self,
 | |
|         expected,
 | |
|         post_token=None,
 | |
|         meta_token=None,
 | |
|         token_header=None,
 | |
|     ):
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_csrf_cookie_request(
 | |
|             post_token=post_token,
 | |
|             meta_token=meta_token,
 | |
|             token_header=token_header,
 | |
|         )
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|         with self.assertLogs("django.security.csrf", "WARNING") as cm:
 | |
|             resp = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(resp["Content-Type"], "text/html; charset=utf-8")
 | |
|         self.assertForbiddenReason(resp, cm, expected)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_csrf_cookie_bad_or_missing_token(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         If a CSRF cookie is present but the token is missing or invalid, the
 | |
|         middleware rejects the incoming request.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         cases = [
 | |
|             (None, None, REASON_CSRF_TOKEN_MISSING),
 | |
|             (16 * "a", None, "CSRF token from POST has incorrect length."),
 | |
|             (64 * "*", None, "CSRF token from POST has invalid characters."),
 | |
|             (64 * "a", None, "CSRF token from POST incorrect."),
 | |
|             (
 | |
|                 None,
 | |
|                 16 * "a",
 | |
|                 "CSRF token from the 'X-Csrftoken' HTTP header has incorrect length.",
 | |
|             ),
 | |
|             (
 | |
|                 None,
 | |
|                 64 * "*",
 | |
|                 "CSRF token from the 'X-Csrftoken' HTTP header has invalid characters.",
 | |
|             ),
 | |
|             (
 | |
|                 None,
 | |
|                 64 * "a",
 | |
|                 "CSRF token from the 'X-Csrftoken' HTTP header incorrect.",
 | |
|             ),
 | |
|         ]
 | |
|         for post_token, meta_token, expected in cases:
 | |
|             with self.subTest(post_token=post_token, meta_token=meta_token):
 | |
|                 self._check_bad_or_missing_token(
 | |
|                     expected,
 | |
|                     post_token=post_token,
 | |
|                     meta_token=meta_token,
 | |
|                 )
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(CSRF_HEADER_NAME="HTTP_X_CSRFTOKEN_CUSTOMIZED")
 | |
|     def test_csrf_cookie_bad_token_custom_header(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         If a CSRF cookie is present and an invalid token is passed via a
 | |
|         custom CSRF_HEADER_NAME, the middleware rejects the incoming request.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         expected = (
 | |
|             "CSRF token from the 'X-Csrftoken-Customized' HTTP header has "
 | |
|             "incorrect length."
 | |
|         )
 | |
|         self._check_bad_or_missing_token(
 | |
|             expected,
 | |
|             meta_token=16 * "a",
 | |
|             token_header="HTTP_X_CSRFTOKEN_CUSTOMIZED",
 | |
|         )
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_process_request_csrf_cookie_and_token(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         If both a cookie and a token is present, the middleware lets it
 | |
|         through.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|         resp = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertIsNone(resp)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_process_request_csrf_cookie_no_token_exempt_view(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         If a CSRF cookie is present and no token, but the csrf_exempt decorator
 | |
|         has been applied to the view, the middleware lets it through
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_csrf_cookie_request()
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|         resp = mw.process_view(req, csrf_exempt(post_form_view), (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertIsNone(resp)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_csrf_token_in_header(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         The token may be passed in a header instead of in the form.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_csrf_cookie_request(meta_token=self._csrf_id_token)
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|         resp = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertIsNone(resp)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(CSRF_HEADER_NAME="HTTP_X_CSRFTOKEN_CUSTOMIZED")
 | |
|     def test_csrf_token_in_header_with_customized_name(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         settings.CSRF_HEADER_NAME can be used to customize the CSRF header name
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_csrf_cookie_request(
 | |
|             meta_token=self._csrf_id_token,
 | |
|             token_header="HTTP_X_CSRFTOKEN_CUSTOMIZED",
 | |
|         )
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|         resp = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertIsNone(resp)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_put_and_delete_rejected(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         HTTP PUT and DELETE methods have protection
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_request(method="PUT")
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         with self.assertLogs("django.security.csrf", "WARNING") as cm:
 | |
|             resp = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertForbiddenReason(resp, cm, REASON_NO_CSRF_COOKIE)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         req = self._get_request(method="DELETE")
 | |
|         with self.assertLogs("django.security.csrf", "WARNING") as cm:
 | |
|             resp = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertForbiddenReason(resp, cm, REASON_NO_CSRF_COOKIE)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_put_and_delete_allowed(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         HTTP PUT and DELETE can get through with X-CSRFToken and a cookie.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_csrf_cookie_request(
 | |
|             method="PUT", meta_token=self._csrf_id_token
 | |
|         )
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|         resp = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertIsNone(resp)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         req = self._get_csrf_cookie_request(
 | |
|             method="DELETE", meta_token=self._csrf_id_token
 | |
|         )
 | |
|         mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|         resp = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertIsNone(resp)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_rotate_token_triggers_second_reset(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         If rotate_token() is called after the token is reset in
 | |
|         CsrfViewMiddleware's process_response() and before another call to
 | |
|         the same process_response(), the cookie is reset a second time.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         resp = sandwiched_rotate_token_view(req)
 | |
|         self.assertContains(resp, "OK")
 | |
|         actual_secret = self._read_csrf_cookie(req, resp)
 | |
|         # set_cookie() was called a second time with a different secret.
 | |
|         cookies_set = self._get_cookies_set(req, resp)
 | |
|         # Only compare the last two to exclude a spurious entry that's present
 | |
|         # when CsrfViewMiddlewareUseSessionsTests is running.
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(cookies_set[-2:], [TEST_SECRET, actual_secret])
 | |
|         self.assertNotEqual(actual_secret, TEST_SECRET)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     # Tests for the template tag method
 | |
|     def test_token_node_no_csrf_cookie(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         CsrfTokenNode works when no CSRF cookie is set.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_request()
 | |
|         resp = token_view(req)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         token = get_token(req)
 | |
|         self.assertIsNotNone(token)
 | |
|         csrf_secret = _unmask_cipher_token(token)
 | |
|         self._check_token_present(resp, csrf_secret)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_token_node_empty_csrf_cookie(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         A new token is sent if the csrf_cookie is the empty string.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_request(cookie="")
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(token_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_view(req, token_view, (), {})
 | |
|         resp = token_view(req)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         token = get_token(req)
 | |
|         self.assertIsNotNone(token)
 | |
|         csrf_secret = _unmask_cipher_token(token)
 | |
|         self._check_token_present(resp, csrf_secret)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_token_node_with_csrf_cookie(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         CsrfTokenNode works when a CSRF cookie is set.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_csrf_cookie_request()
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(token_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|         mw.process_view(req, token_view, (), {})
 | |
|         resp = token_view(req)
 | |
|         self._check_token_present(resp)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_get_token_for_exempt_view(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         get_token still works for a view decorated with 'csrf_exempt'.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_csrf_cookie_request()
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(token_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|         mw.process_view(req, csrf_exempt(token_view), (), {})
 | |
|         resp = token_view(req)
 | |
|         self._check_token_present(resp)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_get_token_for_requires_csrf_token_view(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         get_token() works for a view decorated solely with requires_csrf_token.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_csrf_cookie_request()
 | |
|         resp = requires_csrf_token(token_view)(req)
 | |
|         self._check_token_present(resp)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_token_node_with_new_csrf_cookie(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         CsrfTokenNode works when a CSRF cookie is created by
 | |
|         the middleware (when one was not already present)
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_request()
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(token_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_view(req, token_view, (), {})
 | |
|         resp = mw(req)
 | |
|         csrf_cookie = self._read_csrf_cookie(req, resp)
 | |
|         self._check_token_present(resp, csrf_cookie)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_cookie_not_reset_on_accepted_request(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         The csrf token used in posts is changed on every request (although
 | |
|         stays equivalent). The csrf cookie should not change on accepted
 | |
|         requests. If it appears in the response, it should keep its value.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(token_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|         mw.process_view(req, token_view, (), {})
 | |
|         resp = mw(req)
 | |
|         csrf_cookie = self._read_csrf_cookie(req, resp)
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(
 | |
|             csrf_cookie,
 | |
|             TEST_SECRET,
 | |
|             "CSRF cookie was changed on an accepted request",
 | |
|         )
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(DEBUG=True, ALLOWED_HOSTS=["www.example.com"])
 | |
|     def test_https_bad_referer(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         A POST HTTPS request with a bad referer is rejected
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         req._is_secure_override = True
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_HOST"] = "www.example.com"
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_REFERER"] = "https://www.evil.org/somepage"
 | |
|         req.META["SERVER_PORT"] = "443"
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertContains(
 | |
|             response,
 | |
|             "Referer checking failed - https://www.evil.org/somepage does not "
 | |
|             "match any trusted origins.",
 | |
|             status_code=403,
 | |
|         )
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _check_referer_rejects(self, mw, req):
 | |
|         with self.assertRaises(RejectRequest):
 | |
|             mw._check_referer(req)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(DEBUG=True)
 | |
|     def test_https_no_referer(self):
 | |
|         """A POST HTTPS request with a missing referer is rejected."""
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         req._is_secure_override = True
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         self._check_referer_rejects(mw, req)
 | |
|         response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertContains(
 | |
|             response,
 | |
|             "Referer checking failed - no Referer.",
 | |
|             status_code=403,
 | |
|         )
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_https_malformed_host(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         CsrfViewMiddleware generates a 403 response if it receives an HTTPS
 | |
|         request with a bad host.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_request(method="POST")
 | |
|         req._is_secure_override = True
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_HOST"] = "@malformed"
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_REFERER"] = "https://www.evil.org/somepage"
 | |
|         req.META["SERVER_PORT"] = "443"
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(token_view)
 | |
|         expected = (
 | |
|             "Referer checking failed - https://www.evil.org/somepage does not "
 | |
|             "match any trusted origins."
 | |
|         )
 | |
|         with self.assertRaisesMessage(RejectRequest, expected):
 | |
|             mw._check_referer(req)
 | |
|         response = mw.process_view(req, token_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_origin_malformed_host(self):
 | |
|         req = self._get_request(method="POST")
 | |
|         req._is_secure_override = True
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_HOST"] = "@malformed"
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_ORIGIN"] = "https://www.evil.org"
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(token_view)
 | |
|         self._check_referer_rejects(mw, req)
 | |
|         response = mw.process_view(req, token_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(DEBUG=True)
 | |
|     def test_https_malformed_referer(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         A POST HTTPS request with a bad referer is rejected.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         malformed_referer_msg = "Referer checking failed - Referer is malformed."
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         req._is_secure_override = True
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_REFERER"] = "http://http://www.example.com/"
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         self._check_referer_rejects(mw, req)
 | |
|         response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertContains(
 | |
|             response,
 | |
|             "Referer checking failed - Referer is insecure while host is secure.",
 | |
|             status_code=403,
 | |
|         )
 | |
|         # Empty
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_REFERER"] = ""
 | |
|         self._check_referer_rejects(mw, req)
 | |
|         response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertContains(response, malformed_referer_msg, status_code=403)
 | |
|         # Non-ASCII
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_REFERER"] = "ØBöIß"
 | |
|         self._check_referer_rejects(mw, req)
 | |
|         response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertContains(response, malformed_referer_msg, status_code=403)
 | |
|         # missing scheme
 | |
|         # >>> urlsplit('//example.com/')
 | |
|         # SplitResult(scheme='', netloc='example.com', path='/', query='',
 | |
|         # fragment='')
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_REFERER"] = "//example.com/"
 | |
|         self._check_referer_rejects(mw, req)
 | |
|         response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertContains(response, malformed_referer_msg, status_code=403)
 | |
|         # missing netloc
 | |
|         # >>> urlsplit('https://')
 | |
|         # SplitResult(scheme='https', netloc='', path='', query='',
 | |
|         # fragment='')
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_REFERER"] = "https://"
 | |
|         self._check_referer_rejects(mw, req)
 | |
|         response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertContains(response, malformed_referer_msg, status_code=403)
 | |
|         # Invalid URL
 | |
|         # >>> urlsplit('https://[')
 | |
|         # ValueError: Invalid IPv6 URL
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_REFERER"] = "https://["
 | |
|         self._check_referer_rejects(mw, req)
 | |
|         response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertContains(response, malformed_referer_msg, status_code=403)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(ALLOWED_HOSTS=["www.example.com"])
 | |
|     def test_https_good_referer(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         A POST HTTPS request with a good referer is accepted.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         req._is_secure_override = True
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_HOST"] = "www.example.com"
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_REFERER"] = "https://www.example.com/somepage"
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|         resp = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertIsNone(resp)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(ALLOWED_HOSTS=["www.example.com"])
 | |
|     def test_https_good_referer_2(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         A POST HTTPS request with a good referer is accepted where the referer
 | |
|         contains no trailing slash.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         # See ticket #15617
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         req._is_secure_override = True
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_HOST"] = "www.example.com"
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_REFERER"] = "https://www.example.com"
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|         resp = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertIsNone(resp)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _test_https_good_referer_behind_proxy(self):
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         req._is_secure_override = True
 | |
|         req.META.update(
 | |
|             {
 | |
|                 "HTTP_HOST": "10.0.0.2",
 | |
|                 "HTTP_REFERER": "https://www.example.com/somepage",
 | |
|                 "SERVER_PORT": "8080",
 | |
|                 "HTTP_X_FORWARDED_HOST": "www.example.com",
 | |
|                 "HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PORT": "443",
 | |
|             }
 | |
|         )
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|         resp = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertIsNone(resp)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS=["https://dashboard.example.com"])
 | |
|     def test_https_good_referer_malformed_host(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         A POST HTTPS request is accepted if it receives a good referer with
 | |
|         a bad host.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         req._is_secure_override = True
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_HOST"] = "@malformed"
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_REFERER"] = "https://dashboard.example.com/somepage"
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|         resp = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertIsNone(resp)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(
 | |
|         ALLOWED_HOSTS=["www.example.com"],
 | |
|         CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS=["https://dashboard.example.com"],
 | |
|     )
 | |
|     def test_https_csrf_trusted_origin_allowed(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         A POST HTTPS request with a referer added to the CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS
 | |
|         setting is accepted.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         req._is_secure_override = True
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_HOST"] = "www.example.com"
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_REFERER"] = "https://dashboard.example.com"
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|         resp = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertIsNone(resp)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(
 | |
|         ALLOWED_HOSTS=["www.example.com"],
 | |
|         CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS=["https://*.example.com"],
 | |
|     )
 | |
|     def test_https_csrf_wildcard_trusted_origin_allowed(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         A POST HTTPS request with a referer that matches a CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS
 | |
|         wildcard is accepted.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         req._is_secure_override = True
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_HOST"] = "www.example.com"
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_REFERER"] = "https://dashboard.example.com"
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|         response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertIsNone(response)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _test_https_good_referer_matches_cookie_domain(self):
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         req._is_secure_override = True
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_REFERER"] = "https://foo.example.com/"
 | |
|         req.META["SERVER_PORT"] = "443"
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|         response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertIsNone(response)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _test_https_good_referer_matches_cookie_domain_with_different_port(self):
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         req._is_secure_override = True
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_HOST"] = "www.example.com"
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_REFERER"] = "https://foo.example.com:4443/"
 | |
|         req.META["SERVER_PORT"] = "4443"
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|         response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertIsNone(response)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_ensures_csrf_cookie_no_logging(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         ensure_csrf_cookie() doesn't log warnings (#19436).
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         with self.assertNoLogs("django.security.csrf", "WARNING"):
 | |
|             req = self._get_request()
 | |
|             ensure_csrf_cookie_view(req)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_reading_post_data_raises_unreadable_post_error(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         An UnreadablePostError raised while reading the POST data should be
 | |
|         handled by the middleware.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|         resp = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertIsNone(resp)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token(request_class=PostErrorRequest)
 | |
|         req.post_error = UnreadablePostError("Error reading input data.")
 | |
|         mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|         with self.assertLogs("django.security.csrf", "WARNING") as cm:
 | |
|             resp = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertForbiddenReason(resp, cm, REASON_CSRF_TOKEN_MISSING)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_reading_post_data_raises_os_error(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         An OSError raised while reading the POST data should not be handled by
 | |
|         the middleware.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token(request_class=PostErrorRequest)
 | |
|         req.post_error = OSError("Deleted directories/Missing permissions.")
 | |
|         mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|         with self.assertRaises(OSError):
 | |
|             mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(ALLOWED_HOSTS=["www.example.com"])
 | |
|     def test_bad_origin_bad_domain(self):
 | |
|         """A request with a bad origin is rejected."""
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_HOST"] = "www.example.com"
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_ORIGIN"] = "https://www.evil.org"
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         self._check_referer_rejects(mw, req)
 | |
|         self.assertIs(mw._origin_verified(req), False)
 | |
|         with self.assertLogs("django.security.csrf", "WARNING") as cm:
 | |
|             response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         msg = REASON_BAD_ORIGIN % req.META["HTTP_ORIGIN"]
 | |
|         self.assertForbiddenReason(response, cm, msg)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(ALLOWED_HOSTS=["www.example.com"])
 | |
|     def test_bad_origin_null_origin(self):
 | |
|         """A request with a null origin is rejected."""
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_HOST"] = "www.example.com"
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_ORIGIN"] = "null"
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         self._check_referer_rejects(mw, req)
 | |
|         self.assertIs(mw._origin_verified(req), False)
 | |
|         with self.assertLogs("django.security.csrf", "WARNING") as cm:
 | |
|             response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         msg = REASON_BAD_ORIGIN % req.META["HTTP_ORIGIN"]
 | |
|         self.assertForbiddenReason(response, cm, msg)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(ALLOWED_HOSTS=["www.example.com"])
 | |
|     def test_bad_origin_bad_protocol(self):
 | |
|         """A request with an origin with wrong protocol is rejected."""
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         req._is_secure_override = True
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_HOST"] = "www.example.com"
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_ORIGIN"] = "http://example.com"
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         self._check_referer_rejects(mw, req)
 | |
|         self.assertIs(mw._origin_verified(req), False)
 | |
|         with self.assertLogs("django.security.csrf", "WARNING") as cm:
 | |
|             response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         msg = REASON_BAD_ORIGIN % req.META["HTTP_ORIGIN"]
 | |
|         self.assertForbiddenReason(response, cm, msg)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(
 | |
|         ALLOWED_HOSTS=["www.example.com"],
 | |
|         CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS=[
 | |
|             "http://no-match.com",
 | |
|             "https://*.example.com",
 | |
|             "http://*.no-match.com",
 | |
|             "http://*.no-match-2.com",
 | |
|         ],
 | |
|     )
 | |
|     def test_bad_origin_csrf_trusted_origin_bad_protocol(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         A request with an origin with the wrong protocol compared to
 | |
|         CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS is rejected.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         req._is_secure_override = True
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_HOST"] = "www.example.com"
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_ORIGIN"] = "http://foo.example.com"
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         self._check_referer_rejects(mw, req)
 | |
|         self.assertIs(mw._origin_verified(req), False)
 | |
|         with self.assertLogs("django.security.csrf", "WARNING") as cm:
 | |
|             response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         msg = REASON_BAD_ORIGIN % req.META["HTTP_ORIGIN"]
 | |
|         self.assertForbiddenReason(response, cm, msg)
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(mw.allowed_origins_exact, {"http://no-match.com"})
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(
 | |
|             mw.allowed_origin_subdomains,
 | |
|             {
 | |
|                 "https": [".example.com"],
 | |
|                 "http": [".no-match.com", ".no-match-2.com"],
 | |
|             },
 | |
|         )
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(ALLOWED_HOSTS=["www.example.com"])
 | |
|     def test_bad_origin_cannot_be_parsed(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         A POST request with an origin that can't be parsed by urlsplit() is
 | |
|         rejected.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_HOST"] = "www.example.com"
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_ORIGIN"] = "https://["
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         self._check_referer_rejects(mw, req)
 | |
|         self.assertIs(mw._origin_verified(req), False)
 | |
|         with self.assertLogs("django.security.csrf", "WARNING") as cm:
 | |
|             response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         msg = REASON_BAD_ORIGIN % req.META["HTTP_ORIGIN"]
 | |
|         self.assertForbiddenReason(response, cm, msg)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(ALLOWED_HOSTS=["www.example.com"])
 | |
|     def test_good_origin_insecure(self):
 | |
|         """A POST HTTP request with a good origin is accepted."""
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_HOST"] = "www.example.com"
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_ORIGIN"] = "http://www.example.com"
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         self.assertIs(mw._origin_verified(req), True)
 | |
|         response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertIsNone(response)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(ALLOWED_HOSTS=["www.example.com"])
 | |
|     def test_good_origin_secure(self):
 | |
|         """A POST HTTPS request with a good origin is accepted."""
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         req._is_secure_override = True
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_HOST"] = "www.example.com"
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_ORIGIN"] = "https://www.example.com"
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         self.assertIs(mw._origin_verified(req), True)
 | |
|         response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertIsNone(response)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(
 | |
|         ALLOWED_HOSTS=["www.example.com"],
 | |
|         CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS=["https://dashboard.example.com"],
 | |
|     )
 | |
|     def test_good_origin_csrf_trusted_origin_allowed(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         A POST request with an origin added to the CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS
 | |
|         setting is accepted.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         req._is_secure_override = True
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_HOST"] = "www.example.com"
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_ORIGIN"] = "https://dashboard.example.com"
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         self.assertIs(mw._origin_verified(req), True)
 | |
|         resp = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertIsNone(resp)
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(mw.allowed_origins_exact, {"https://dashboard.example.com"})
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(mw.allowed_origin_subdomains, {})
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(
 | |
|         ALLOWED_HOSTS=["www.example.com"],
 | |
|         CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS=["https://*.example.com"],
 | |
|     )
 | |
|     def test_good_origin_wildcard_csrf_trusted_origin_allowed(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         A POST request with an origin that matches a CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS
 | |
|         wildcard is accepted.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         req._is_secure_override = True
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_HOST"] = "www.example.com"
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_ORIGIN"] = "https://foo.example.com"
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         self.assertIs(mw._origin_verified(req), True)
 | |
|         response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertIsNone(response)
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(mw.allowed_origins_exact, set())
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(mw.allowed_origin_subdomains, {"https": [".example.com"]})
 | |
| 
 | |
| 
 | |
| class CsrfViewMiddlewareTests(CsrfViewMiddlewareTestMixin, SimpleTestCase):
 | |
|     def _set_csrf_cookie(self, req, cookie):
 | |
|         req.COOKIES[settings.CSRF_COOKIE_NAME] = cookie
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _read_csrf_cookie(self, req, resp):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         Return the CSRF cookie as a string, or False if no cookie is present.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         if settings.CSRF_COOKIE_NAME not in resp.cookies:
 | |
|             return False
 | |
|         csrf_cookie = resp.cookies[settings.CSRF_COOKIE_NAME]
 | |
|         return csrf_cookie.value
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _get_cookies_set(self, req, resp):
 | |
|         return resp._cookies_set
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_ensures_csrf_cookie_no_middleware(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         The ensure_csrf_cookie() decorator works without middleware.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_request()
 | |
|         resp = ensure_csrf_cookie_view(req)
 | |
|         csrf_cookie = self._read_csrf_cookie(req, resp)
 | |
|         self.assertTrue(csrf_cookie)
 | |
|         self.assertIn("Cookie", resp.get("Vary", ""))
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_ensures_csrf_cookie_with_middleware(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         The ensure_csrf_cookie() decorator works with the CsrfViewMiddleware
 | |
|         enabled.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_request()
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(ensure_csrf_cookie_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_view(req, ensure_csrf_cookie_view, (), {})
 | |
|         resp = mw(req)
 | |
|         csrf_cookie = self._read_csrf_cookie(req, resp)
 | |
|         self.assertTrue(csrf_cookie)
 | |
|         self.assertIn("Cookie", resp.get("Vary", ""))
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_csrf_cookie_age(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         CSRF cookie age can be set using settings.CSRF_COOKIE_AGE.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_request()
 | |
| 
 | |
|         MAX_AGE = 123
 | |
|         with self.settings(
 | |
|             CSRF_COOKIE_NAME="csrfcookie",
 | |
|             CSRF_COOKIE_DOMAIN=".example.com",
 | |
|             CSRF_COOKIE_AGE=MAX_AGE,
 | |
|             CSRF_COOKIE_PATH="/test/",
 | |
|             CSRF_COOKIE_SECURE=True,
 | |
|             CSRF_COOKIE_HTTPONLY=True,
 | |
|         ):
 | |
|             # token_view calls get_token() indirectly
 | |
|             mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(token_view)
 | |
|             mw.process_view(req, token_view, (), {})
 | |
|             resp = mw(req)
 | |
|             max_age = resp.cookies.get("csrfcookie").get("max-age")
 | |
|             self.assertEqual(max_age, MAX_AGE)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_csrf_cookie_age_none(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         CSRF cookie age does not have max age set and therefore uses
 | |
|         session-based cookies.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_request()
 | |
| 
 | |
|         MAX_AGE = None
 | |
|         with self.settings(
 | |
|             CSRF_COOKIE_NAME="csrfcookie",
 | |
|             CSRF_COOKIE_DOMAIN=".example.com",
 | |
|             CSRF_COOKIE_AGE=MAX_AGE,
 | |
|             CSRF_COOKIE_PATH="/test/",
 | |
|             CSRF_COOKIE_SECURE=True,
 | |
|             CSRF_COOKIE_HTTPONLY=True,
 | |
|         ):
 | |
|             # token_view calls get_token() indirectly
 | |
|             mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(token_view)
 | |
|             mw.process_view(req, token_view, (), {})
 | |
|             resp = mw(req)
 | |
|             max_age = resp.cookies.get("csrfcookie").get("max-age")
 | |
|             self.assertEqual(max_age, "")
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_csrf_cookie_samesite(self):
 | |
|         req = self._get_request()
 | |
|         with self.settings(
 | |
|             CSRF_COOKIE_NAME="csrfcookie", CSRF_COOKIE_SAMESITE="Strict"
 | |
|         ):
 | |
|             mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(token_view)
 | |
|             mw.process_view(req, token_view, (), {})
 | |
|             resp = mw(req)
 | |
|             self.assertEqual(resp.cookies["csrfcookie"]["samesite"], "Strict")
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_bad_csrf_cookie_characters(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         If the CSRF cookie has invalid characters in a POST request, the
 | |
|         middleware rejects the incoming request.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         self._check_bad_or_missing_cookie(
 | |
|             64 * "*", "CSRF cookie has invalid characters."
 | |
|         )
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_bad_csrf_cookie_length(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         If the CSRF cookie has an incorrect length in a POST request, the
 | |
|         middleware rejects the incoming request.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         self._check_bad_or_missing_cookie(16 * "a", "CSRF cookie has incorrect length.")
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_process_view_token_too_long(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         If the token is longer than expected, it is ignored and a new token is
 | |
|         created.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_request(cookie="x" * 100000)
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(token_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_view(req, token_view, (), {})
 | |
|         resp = mw(req)
 | |
|         csrf_cookie = self._read_csrf_cookie(req, resp)
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(len(csrf_cookie), CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_process_view_token_invalid_chars(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         If the token contains non-alphanumeric characters, it is ignored and a
 | |
|         new token is created.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         token = ("!@#" + self._csrf_id_token)[:CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH]
 | |
|         req = self._get_request(cookie=token)
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(token_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_view(req, token_view, (), {})
 | |
|         resp = mw(req)
 | |
|         csrf_cookie = self._read_csrf_cookie(req, resp)
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(len(csrf_cookie), CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH)
 | |
|         self.assertNotEqual(csrf_cookie, token)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_masked_unmasked_combinations(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         All combinations are allowed of (1) masked and unmasked cookies,
 | |
|         (2) masked and unmasked tokens, and (3) tokens provided via POST and
 | |
|         the X-CSRFToken header.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         cases = [
 | |
|             (TEST_SECRET, TEST_SECRET, None),
 | |
|             (TEST_SECRET, MASKED_TEST_SECRET2, None),
 | |
|             (TEST_SECRET, None, TEST_SECRET),
 | |
|             (TEST_SECRET, None, MASKED_TEST_SECRET2),
 | |
|             (MASKED_TEST_SECRET1, TEST_SECRET, None),
 | |
|             (MASKED_TEST_SECRET1, MASKED_TEST_SECRET2, None),
 | |
|             (MASKED_TEST_SECRET1, None, TEST_SECRET),
 | |
|             (MASKED_TEST_SECRET1, None, MASKED_TEST_SECRET2),
 | |
|         ]
 | |
|         for args in cases:
 | |
|             with self.subTest(args=args):
 | |
|                 cookie, post_token, meta_token = args
 | |
|                 req = self._get_POST_csrf_cookie_request(
 | |
|                     cookie=cookie,
 | |
|                     post_token=post_token,
 | |
|                     meta_token=meta_token,
 | |
|                 )
 | |
|                 mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(token_view)
 | |
|                 mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|                 resp = mw.process_view(req, token_view, (), {})
 | |
|                 self.assertIsNone(resp)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_set_cookie_called_only_once(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         set_cookie() is called only once when the view is decorated with both
 | |
|         ensure_csrf_cookie and csrf_protect.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         resp = ensured_and_protected_view(req)
 | |
|         self.assertContains(resp, "OK")
 | |
|         csrf_cookie = self._read_csrf_cookie(req, resp)
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(csrf_cookie, TEST_SECRET)
 | |
|         # set_cookie() was called only once and with the expected secret.
 | |
|         cookies_set = self._get_cookies_set(req, resp)
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(cookies_set, [TEST_SECRET])
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_invalid_cookie_replaced_on_GET(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         A CSRF cookie with the wrong format is replaced during a GET request.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_request(cookie="badvalue")
 | |
|         resp = protected_view(req)
 | |
|         self.assertContains(resp, "OK")
 | |
|         csrf_cookie = self._read_csrf_cookie(req, resp)
 | |
|         self.assertTrue(csrf_cookie, msg="No CSRF cookie was sent.")
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(len(csrf_cookie), CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_valid_secret_not_replaced_on_GET(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         Masked and unmasked CSRF cookies are not replaced during a GET request.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         cases = [
 | |
|             TEST_SECRET,
 | |
|             MASKED_TEST_SECRET1,
 | |
|         ]
 | |
|         for cookie in cases:
 | |
|             with self.subTest(cookie=cookie):
 | |
|                 req = self._get_request(cookie=cookie)
 | |
|                 resp = protected_view(req)
 | |
|                 self.assertContains(resp, "OK")
 | |
|                 csrf_cookie = self._read_csrf_cookie(req, resp)
 | |
|                 self.assertFalse(csrf_cookie, msg="A CSRF cookie was sent.")
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_masked_secret_accepted_and_replaced(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         For a view that uses the csrf_token, the csrf cookie is replaced with
 | |
|         the unmasked version if originally masked.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token(cookie=MASKED_TEST_SECRET1)
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(token_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|         resp = mw.process_view(req, token_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertIsNone(resp)
 | |
|         resp = mw(req)
 | |
|         csrf_cookie = self._read_csrf_cookie(req, resp)
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(csrf_cookie, TEST_SECRET)
 | |
|         self._check_token_present(resp, csrf_cookie)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_bare_secret_accepted_and_not_replaced(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         The csrf cookie is left unchanged if originally not masked.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token(cookie=TEST_SECRET)
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(token_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|         resp = mw.process_view(req, token_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertIsNone(resp)
 | |
|         resp = mw(req)
 | |
|         csrf_cookie = self._read_csrf_cookie(req, resp)
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(csrf_cookie, TEST_SECRET)
 | |
|         self._check_token_present(resp, csrf_cookie)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(
 | |
|         ALLOWED_HOSTS=["www.example.com"],
 | |
|         CSRF_COOKIE_DOMAIN=".example.com",
 | |
|         USE_X_FORWARDED_PORT=True,
 | |
|     )
 | |
|     def test_https_good_referer_behind_proxy(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         A POST HTTPS request is accepted when USE_X_FORWARDED_PORT=True.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         self._test_https_good_referer_behind_proxy()
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(
 | |
|         ALLOWED_HOSTS=["www.example.com"], CSRF_COOKIE_DOMAIN=".example.com"
 | |
|     )
 | |
|     def test_https_good_referer_matches_cookie_domain(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         A POST HTTPS request with a good referer should be accepted from a
 | |
|         subdomain that's allowed by CSRF_COOKIE_DOMAIN.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         self._test_https_good_referer_matches_cookie_domain()
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(
 | |
|         ALLOWED_HOSTS=["www.example.com"], CSRF_COOKIE_DOMAIN=".example.com"
 | |
|     )
 | |
|     def test_https_good_referer_matches_cookie_domain_with_different_port(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         A POST HTTPS request with a good referer should be accepted from a
 | |
|         subdomain that's allowed by CSRF_COOKIE_DOMAIN and a non-443 port.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         self._test_https_good_referer_matches_cookie_domain_with_different_port()
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(CSRF_COOKIE_DOMAIN=".example.com", DEBUG=True)
 | |
|     def test_https_reject_insecure_referer(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         A POST HTTPS request from an insecure referer should be rejected.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         req._is_secure_override = True
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_REFERER"] = "http://example.com/"
 | |
|         req.META["SERVER_PORT"] = "443"
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         self._check_referer_rejects(mw, req)
 | |
|         response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertContains(
 | |
|             response,
 | |
|             "Referer checking failed - Referer is insecure while host is secure.",
 | |
|             status_code=403,
 | |
|         )
 | |
| 
 | |
| 
 | |
| @override_settings(CSRF_USE_SESSIONS=True, CSRF_COOKIE_DOMAIN=None)
 | |
| class CsrfViewMiddlewareUseSessionsTests(CsrfViewMiddlewareTestMixin, SimpleTestCase):
 | |
|     """
 | |
|     CSRF tests with CSRF_USE_SESSIONS=True.
 | |
|     """
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _set_csrf_cookie(self, req, cookie):
 | |
|         req.session[CSRF_SESSION_KEY] = cookie
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _read_csrf_cookie(self, req, resp=None):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         Return the CSRF cookie as a string, or False if no cookie is present.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         if CSRF_SESSION_KEY not in req.session:
 | |
|             return False
 | |
|         return req.session[CSRF_SESSION_KEY]
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _get_cookies_set(self, req, resp):
 | |
|         return req.session._cookies_set
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_no_session_on_request(self):
 | |
|         msg = (
 | |
|             "CSRF_USE_SESSIONS is enabled, but request.session is not set. "
 | |
|             "SessionMiddleware must appear before CsrfViewMiddleware in MIDDLEWARE."
 | |
|         )
 | |
|         with self.assertRaisesMessage(ImproperlyConfigured, msg):
 | |
|             mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(lambda req: HttpResponse())
 | |
|             mw.process_request(HttpRequest())
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_masked_unmasked_combinations(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         Masked and unmasked tokens are allowed both as POST and as the
 | |
|         X-CSRFToken header.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         cases = [
 | |
|             # Bare secrets are not allowed when CSRF_USE_SESSIONS=True.
 | |
|             (MASKED_TEST_SECRET1, TEST_SECRET, None),
 | |
|             (MASKED_TEST_SECRET1, MASKED_TEST_SECRET2, None),
 | |
|             (MASKED_TEST_SECRET1, None, TEST_SECRET),
 | |
|             (MASKED_TEST_SECRET1, None, MASKED_TEST_SECRET2),
 | |
|         ]
 | |
|         for args in cases:
 | |
|             with self.subTest(args=args):
 | |
|                 cookie, post_token, meta_token = args
 | |
|                 req = self._get_POST_csrf_cookie_request(
 | |
|                     cookie=cookie,
 | |
|                     post_token=post_token,
 | |
|                     meta_token=meta_token,
 | |
|                 )
 | |
|                 mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(token_view)
 | |
|                 mw.process_request(req)
 | |
|                 resp = mw.process_view(req, token_view, (), {})
 | |
|                 self.assertIsNone(resp)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_process_response_get_token_used(self):
 | |
|         """The ensure_csrf_cookie() decorator works without middleware."""
 | |
|         req = self._get_request()
 | |
|         ensure_csrf_cookie_view(req)
 | |
|         csrf_cookie = self._read_csrf_cookie(req)
 | |
|         self.assertTrue(csrf_cookie)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_session_modify(self):
 | |
|         """The session isn't saved if the CSRF cookie is unchanged."""
 | |
|         req = self._get_request()
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(ensure_csrf_cookie_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_view(req, ensure_csrf_cookie_view, (), {})
 | |
|         mw(req)
 | |
|         csrf_cookie = self._read_csrf_cookie(req)
 | |
|         self.assertTrue(csrf_cookie)
 | |
|         req.session.modified = False
 | |
|         mw.process_view(req, ensure_csrf_cookie_view, (), {})
 | |
|         mw(req)
 | |
|         self.assertFalse(req.session.modified)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def test_ensures_csrf_cookie_with_middleware(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         The ensure_csrf_cookie() decorator works with the CsrfViewMiddleware
 | |
|         enabled.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_request()
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(ensure_csrf_cookie_view)
 | |
|         mw.process_view(req, ensure_csrf_cookie_view, (), {})
 | |
|         mw(req)
 | |
|         csrf_cookie = self._read_csrf_cookie(req)
 | |
|         self.assertTrue(csrf_cookie)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(
 | |
|         ALLOWED_HOSTS=["www.example.com"],
 | |
|         SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN=".example.com",
 | |
|         USE_X_FORWARDED_PORT=True,
 | |
|         DEBUG=True,
 | |
|     )
 | |
|     def test_https_good_referer_behind_proxy(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         A POST HTTPS request is accepted when USE_X_FORWARDED_PORT=True.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         self._test_https_good_referer_behind_proxy()
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(
 | |
|         ALLOWED_HOSTS=["www.example.com"], SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN=".example.com"
 | |
|     )
 | |
|     def test_https_good_referer_matches_cookie_domain(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         A POST HTTPS request with a good referer should be accepted from a
 | |
|         subdomain that's allowed by SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         self._test_https_good_referer_matches_cookie_domain()
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(
 | |
|         ALLOWED_HOSTS=["www.example.com"], SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN=".example.com"
 | |
|     )
 | |
|     def test_https_good_referer_matches_cookie_domain_with_different_port(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         A POST HTTPS request with a good referer should be accepted from a
 | |
|         subdomain that's allowed by SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN and a non-443 port.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         self._test_https_good_referer_matches_cookie_domain_with_different_port()
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @override_settings(SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN=".example.com", DEBUG=True)
 | |
|     def test_https_reject_insecure_referer(self):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         A POST HTTPS request from an insecure referer should be rejected.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
 | |
|         req._is_secure_override = True
 | |
|         req.META["HTTP_REFERER"] = "http://example.com/"
 | |
|         req.META["SERVER_PORT"] = "443"
 | |
|         mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
 | |
|         response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
 | |
|         self.assertContains(
 | |
|             response,
 | |
|             "Referer checking failed - Referer is insecure while host is secure.",
 | |
|             status_code=403,
 | |
|         )
 | |
| 
 | |
| 
 | |
| @override_settings(ROOT_URLCONF="csrf_tests.csrf_token_error_handler_urls", DEBUG=False)
 | |
| class CsrfInErrorHandlingViewsTests(CsrfFunctionTestMixin, SimpleTestCase):
 | |
|     def test_csrf_token_on_404_stays_constant(self):
 | |
|         response = self.client.get("/does not exist/")
 | |
|         # The error handler returns status code 599.
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 599)
 | |
|         response.charset = "ascii"
 | |
|         token1 = response.text
 | |
|         response = self.client.get("/does not exist/")
 | |
|         self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 599)
 | |
|         response.charset = "ascii"
 | |
|         token2 = response.text
 | |
|         secret2 = _unmask_cipher_token(token2)
 | |
|         self.assertMaskedSecretCorrect(token1, secret2)
 |