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[1.6.x] Stripped headers containing underscores to prevent spoofing in WSGI environ.
This is a security fix. Disclosure following shortly. Thanks to Jedediah Smith for the report.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -7,6 +7,30 @@ Django 1.4.18 release notes
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Django 1.4.18 fixes several security issues in 1.4.17 as well as a regression
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on Python 2.5 in the 1.4.17 release.
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WSGI header spoofing via underscore/dash conflation
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===================================================
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When HTTP headers are placed into the WSGI environ, they are normalized by
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converting to uppercase, converting all dashes to underscores, and prepending
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`HTTP_`. For instance, a header ``X-Auth-User`` would become
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``HTTP_X_AUTH_USER`` in the WSGI environ (and thus also in Django's
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``request.META`` dictionary).
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Unfortunately, this means that the WSGI environ cannot distinguish between
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headers containing dashes and headers containing underscores: ``X-Auth-User``
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and ``X-Auth_User`` both become ``HTTP_X_AUTH_USER``. This means that if a
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header is used in a security-sensitive way (for instance, passing
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authentication information along from a front-end proxy), even if the proxy
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carefully strips any incoming value for ``X-Auth-User``, an attacker may be
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able to provide an ``X-Auth_User`` header (with underscore) and bypass this
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protection.
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In order to prevent such attacks, both Nginx and Apache 2.4+ strip all headers
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containing underscores from incoming requests by default. Django's built-in
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development server now does the same. Django's development server is not
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recommended for production use, but matching the behavior of common production
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servers reduces the surface area for behavior changes during deployment.
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Bugfixes
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========
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@@ -5,3 +5,27 @@ Django 1.6.10 release notes
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*Under development*
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Django 1.6.10 fixes several security issues in 1.6.9.
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WSGI header spoofing via underscore/dash conflation
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===================================================
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When HTTP headers are placed into the WSGI environ, they are normalized by
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converting to uppercase, converting all dashes to underscores, and prepending
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`HTTP_`. For instance, a header ``X-Auth-User`` would become
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``HTTP_X_AUTH_USER`` in the WSGI environ (and thus also in Django's
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``request.META`` dictionary).
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Unfortunately, this means that the WSGI environ cannot distinguish between
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headers containing dashes and headers containing underscores: ``X-Auth-User``
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and ``X-Auth_User`` both become ``HTTP_X_AUTH_USER``. This means that if a
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header is used in a security-sensitive way (for instance, passing
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authentication information along from a front-end proxy), even if the proxy
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carefully strips any incoming value for ``X-Auth-User``, an attacker may be
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able to provide an ``X-Auth_User`` header (with underscore) and bypass this
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protection.
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In order to prevent such attacks, both Nginx and Apache 2.4+ strip all headers
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containing underscores from incoming requests by default. Django's built-in
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development server now does the same. Django's development server is not
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recommended for production use, but matching the behavior of common production
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servers reduces the surface area for behavior changes during deployment.
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