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Fixed CVE-2023-23969 -- Prevented DoS with pathological values for Accept-Language.
The parsed values of Accept-Language headers are cached in order to avoid repetitive parsing. This leads to a potential denial-of-service vector via excessive memory usage if the raw value of Accept-Language headers is very large. Accept-Language headers are now limited to a maximum length in order to avoid this issue.
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Mariusz Felisiak
parent
110b3b8356
commit
8c660fb592
@@ -30,6 +30,11 @@ _default = None
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# magic gettext number to separate context from message
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CONTEXT_SEPARATOR = "\x04"
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# Maximum number of characters that will be parsed from the Accept-Language
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# header to prevent possible denial of service or memory exhaustion attacks.
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# About 10x longer than the longest value shown on MDN’s Accept-Language page.
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ACCEPT_LANGUAGE_HEADER_MAX_LENGTH = 500
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# Format of Accept-Language header values. From RFC 9110 Sections 12.4.2 and
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# 12.5.4, and RFC 5646 Section 2.1.
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accept_language_re = _lazy_re_compile(
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@@ -582,7 +587,7 @@ def get_language_from_request(request, check_path=False):
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@functools.lru_cache(maxsize=1000)
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def parse_accept_lang_header(lang_string):
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def _parse_accept_lang_header(lang_string):
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"""
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Parse the lang_string, which is the body of an HTTP Accept-Language
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header, and return a tuple of (lang, q-value), ordered by 'q' values.
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@@ -604,3 +609,27 @@ def parse_accept_lang_header(lang_string):
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result.append((lang, priority))
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result.sort(key=lambda k: k[1], reverse=True)
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return tuple(result)
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def parse_accept_lang_header(lang_string):
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"""
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Parse the value of the Accept-Language header up to a maximum length.
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The value of the header is truncated to a maximum length to avoid potential
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denial of service and memory exhaustion attacks. Excessive memory could be
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used if the raw value is very large as it would be cached due to the use of
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functools.lru_cache() to avoid repetitive parsing of common header values.
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"""
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# If the header value doesn't exceed the maximum allowed length, parse it.
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if len(lang_string) <= ACCEPT_LANGUAGE_HEADER_MAX_LENGTH:
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return _parse_accept_lang_header(lang_string)
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# If there is at least one comma in the value, parse up to the last comma
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# before the max length, skipping any truncated parts at the end of the
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# header value.
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if (index := lang_string.rfind(",", 0, ACCEPT_LANGUAGE_HEADER_MAX_LENGTH)) > 0:
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return _parse_accept_lang_header(lang_string[:index])
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# Don't attempt to parse if there is only one language-range value which is
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# longer than the maximum allowed length and so truncated.
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return ()
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