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mirror of https://github.com/django/django.git synced 2024-12-22 17:16:24 +00:00

Fixed CVE-2024-39329 -- Standarized timing of verify_password() when checking unusuable passwords.

Refs #20760.

Thanks Michael Manfre for the fix and to Adam Johnson for the review.
This commit is contained in:
Michael Manfre 2024-06-14 22:12:58 -04:00 committed by Natalia
parent d666457453
commit 5d86458579
4 changed files with 54 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@ -39,14 +39,20 @@ def verify_password(password, encoded, preferred="default"):
three part encoded digest, and the second whether to regenerate the
password.
"""
if password is None or not is_password_usable(encoded):
return False, False
fake_runtime = password is None or not is_password_usable(encoded)
preferred = get_hasher(preferred)
try:
hasher = identify_hasher(encoded)
except ValueError:
# encoded is gibberish or uses a hasher that's no longer installed.
fake_runtime = True
if fake_runtime:
# Run the default password hasher once to reduce the timing difference
# between an existing user with an unusable password and a nonexistent
# user or missing hasher (similar to #20760).
make_password(get_random_string(UNUSABLE_PASSWORD_SUFFIX_LENGTH))
return False, False
hasher_changed = hasher.algorithm != preferred.algorithm

View File

@ -13,3 +13,10 @@ CVE-2024-38875: Potential denial-of-service vulnerability in ``django.utils.html
:tfilter:`urlize` and :tfilter:`urlizetrunc` were subject to a potential
denial-of-service attack via certain inputs with a very large number of
brackets.
CVE-2024-39329: Username enumeration through timing difference for users with unusable passwords
================================================================================================
The :meth:`~django.contrib.auth.backends.ModelBackend.authenticate()` method
allowed remote attackers to enumerate users via a timing attack involving login
requests for users with unusable passwords.

View File

@ -14,6 +14,13 @@ CVE-2024-38875: Potential denial-of-service vulnerability in ``django.utils.html
denial-of-service attack via certain inputs with a very large number of
brackets.
CVE-2024-39329: Username enumeration through timing difference for users with unusable passwords
================================================================================================
The :meth:`~django.contrib.auth.backends.ModelBackend.authenticate()` method
allowed remote attackers to enumerate users via a timing attack involving login
requests for users with unusable passwords.
Bugfixes
========

View File

@ -452,6 +452,38 @@ class TestUtilsHashPass(SimpleTestCase):
check_password("wrong_password", encoded)
self.assertEqual(hasher.harden_runtime.call_count, 1)
def test_check_password_calls_make_password_to_fake_runtime(self):
hasher = get_hasher("default")
cases = [
(None, None, None), # no plain text password provided
("foo", make_password(password=None), None), # unusable encoded
("letmein", make_password(password="letmein"), ValueError), # valid encoded
]
for password, encoded, hasher_side_effect in cases:
with (
self.subTest(encoded=encoded),
mock.patch(
"django.contrib.auth.hashers.identify_hasher",
side_effect=hasher_side_effect,
) as mock_identify_hasher,
mock.patch(
"django.contrib.auth.hashers.make_password"
) as mock_make_password,
mock.patch(
"django.contrib.auth.hashers.get_random_string",
side_effect=lambda size: "x" * size,
),
mock.patch.object(hasher, "verify"),
):
# Ensure make_password is called to standardize timing.
check_password(password, encoded)
self.assertEqual(hasher.verify.call_count, 0)
self.assertEqual(mock_identify_hasher.mock_calls, [mock.call(encoded)])
self.assertEqual(
mock_make_password.mock_calls,
[mock.call("x" * UNUSABLE_PASSWORD_SUFFIX_LENGTH)],
)
def test_encode_invalid_salt(self):
hasher_classes = [
MD5PasswordHasher,