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mirror of https://github.com/django/django.git synced 2024-12-22 09:05:43 +00:00

Fixed CVE-2024-53907 -- Mitigated potential DoS in strip_tags().

Thanks to jiangniao for the report, and Shai Berger and Natalia Bidart
for the reviews.
This commit is contained in:
Sarah Boyce 2024-11-13 15:06:23 +01:00
parent 58e548db8b
commit 49ff1042aa
5 changed files with 63 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ from collections.abc import Mapping
from html.parser import HTMLParser
from urllib.parse import parse_qsl, quote, unquote, urlencode, urlsplit, urlunsplit
from django.core.exceptions import SuspiciousOperation
from django.utils.deprecation import RemovedInDjango60Warning
from django.utils.encoding import punycode
from django.utils.functional import Promise, cached_property, keep_lazy, keep_lazy_text
@ -40,6 +41,7 @@ VOID_ELEMENTS = frozenset(
)
MAX_URL_LENGTH = 2048
MAX_STRIP_TAGS_DEPTH = 50
@keep_lazy(SafeString)
@ -211,15 +213,19 @@ def _strip_once(value):
@keep_lazy_text
def strip_tags(value):
"""Return the given HTML with all tags stripped."""
# Note: in typical case this loop executes _strip_once once. Loop condition
# is redundant, but helps to reduce number of executions of _strip_once.
value = str(value)
# Note: in typical case this loop executes _strip_once twice (the second
# execution does not remove any more tags).
strip_tags_depth = 0
while "<" in value and ">" in value:
if strip_tags_depth >= MAX_STRIP_TAGS_DEPTH:
raise SuspiciousOperation
new_value = _strip_once(value)
if value.count("<") == new_value.count("<"):
# _strip_once wasn't able to detect more tags.
break
value = new_value
strip_tags_depth += 1
return value

View File

@ -6,3 +6,19 @@ Django 4.2.17 release notes
Django 4.2.17 fixes one security issue with severity "high" and one security
issue with severity "moderate" in 4.2.16.
CVE-2024-53907: Denial-of-service possibility in ``strip_tags()``
=================================================================
:func:`~django.utils.html.strip_tags` would be extremely slow to evaluate
certain inputs containing large sequences of nested incomplete HTML entities.
The ``strip_tags()`` method is used to implement the corresponding
:tfilter:`striptags` template filter, which was thus also vulnerable.
``strip_tags()`` now has an upper limit of recursive calls to ``HTMLParser``
before raising a :exc:`.SuspiciousOperation` exception.
Remember that absolutely NO guarantee is provided about the results of
``strip_tags()`` being HTML safe. So NEVER mark safe the result of a
``strip_tags()`` call without escaping it first, for example with
:func:`django.utils.html.escape`.

View File

@ -6,3 +6,19 @@ Django 5.0.10 release notes
Django 5.0.10 fixes one security issue with severity "high" and one security
issue with severity "moderate" in 5.0.9.
CVE-2024-53907: Denial-of-service possibility in ``strip_tags()``
=================================================================
:func:`~django.utils.html.strip_tags` would be extremely slow to evaluate
certain inputs containing large sequences of nested incomplete HTML entities.
The ``strip_tags()`` method is used to implement the corresponding
:tfilter:`striptags` template filter, which was thus also vulnerable.
``strip_tags()`` now has an upper limit of recursive calls to ``HTMLParser``
before raising a :exc:`.SuspiciousOperation` exception.
Remember that absolutely NO guarantee is provided about the results of
``strip_tags()`` being HTML safe. So NEVER mark safe the result of a
``strip_tags()`` call without escaping it first, for example with
:func:`django.utils.html.escape`.

View File

@ -7,6 +7,22 @@ Django 5.1.4 release notes
Django 5.1.4 fixes one security issue with severity "high", one security issue
with severity "moderate", and several bugs in 5.1.3.
CVE-2024-53907: Denial-of-service possibility in ``strip_tags()``
=================================================================
:func:`~django.utils.html.strip_tags` would be extremely slow to evaluate
certain inputs containing large sequences of nested incomplete HTML entities.
The ``strip_tags()`` method is used to implement the corresponding
:tfilter:`striptags` template filter, which was thus also vulnerable.
``strip_tags()`` now has an upper limit of recursive calls to ``HTMLParser``
before raising a :exc:`.SuspiciousOperation` exception.
Remember that absolutely NO guarantee is provided about the results of
``strip_tags()`` being HTML safe. So NEVER mark safe the result of a
``strip_tags()`` call without escaping it first, for example with
:func:`django.utils.html.escape`.
Bugfixes
========

View File

@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
import os
from datetime import datetime
from django.core.exceptions import SuspiciousOperation
from django.core.serializers.json import DjangoJSONEncoder
from django.test import SimpleTestCase
from django.utils.deprecation import RemovedInDjango60Warning
@ -145,12 +146,18 @@ class TestUtilsHtml(SimpleTestCase):
("<script>alert()</script>&h", "alert()h"),
("><!" + ("&" * 16000) + "D", "><!" + ("&" * 16000) + "D"),
("X<<<<br>br>br>br>X", "XX"),
("<" * 50 + "a>" * 50, ""),
)
for value, output in items:
with self.subTest(value=value, output=output):
self.check_output(strip_tags, value, output)
self.check_output(strip_tags, lazystr(value), output)
def test_strip_tags_suspicious_operation(self):
value = "<" * 51 + "a>" * 51, "<a>"
with self.assertRaises(SuspiciousOperation):
strip_tags(value)
def test_strip_tags_files(self):
# Test with more lengthy content (also catching performance regressions)
for filename in ("strip_tags1.html", "strip_tags2.txt"):