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django/docs/releases/2.1.11.txt

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===========================
Django 2.1.11 release notes
===========================
*August 1, 2019*
Django 2.1.11 fixes security issues in 2.1.10.
CVE-2019-14232: Denial-of-service possibility in ``django.utils.text.Truncator``
================================================================================
If ``django.utils.text.Truncator``'s ``chars()`` and ``words()`` methods
were passed the ``html=True`` argument, they were extremely slow to evaluate
certain inputs due to a catastrophic backtracking vulnerability in a regular
expression. The ``chars()`` and ``words()`` methods are used to implement the
:tfilter:`truncatechars_html` and :tfilter:`truncatewords_html` template
filters, which were thus vulnerable.
The regular expressions used by ``Truncator`` have been simplified in order to
avoid potential backtracking issues. As a consequence, trailing punctuation may
now at times be included in the truncated output.
CVE-2019-14233: Denial-of-service possibility in ``strip_tags()``
=================================================================
Due to the behavior of the underlying ``HTMLParser``,
:func:`django.utils.html.strip_tags` would be extremely slow to evaluate
certain inputs containing large sequences of nested incomplete HTML entities.
The ``strip_tags()`` method is used to implement the corresponding
:tfilter:`striptags` template filter, which was thus also vulnerable.
``strip_tags()`` now avoids recursive calls to ``HTMLParser`` when progress
removing tags, but necessarily incomplete HTML entities, stops being made.
Remember that absolutely NO guarantee is provided about the results of
``strip_tags()`` being HTML safe. So NEVER mark safe the result of a
``strip_tags()`` call without escaping it first, for example with
:func:`django.utils.html.escape`.
CVE-2019-14234: SQL injection possibility in key and index lookups for ``JSONField``/``HStoreField``
====================================================================================================
:lookup:`Key and index lookups <jsonfield.key>` for
``django.contrib.postgres.fields.JSONField`` and :lookup:`key lookups
<hstorefield.key>` for :class:`~django.contrib.postgres.fields.HStoreField`
were subject to SQL injection, using a suitably crafted dictionary, with
dictionary expansion, as the ``**kwargs`` passed to ``QuerySet.filter()``.
CVE-2019-14235: Potential memory exhaustion in ``django.utils.encoding.uri_to_iri()``
=====================================================================================
If passed certain inputs, :func:`django.utils.encoding.uri_to_iri` could lead
to significant memory usage due to excessive recursion when re-percent-encoding
invalid UTF-8 octet sequences.
``uri_to_iri()`` now avoids recursion when re-percent-encoding invalid UTF-8
octet sequences.