django/docs/releases/4.2.14.txt

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===========================
Django 4.2.14 release notes
===========================
*July 9, 2024*
Django 4.2.14 fixes two security issues with severity "moderate" and two
security issues with severity "low" in 4.2.13.
CVE-2024-38875: Potential denial-of-service vulnerability in ``django.utils.html.urlize()``
===========================================================================================
:tfilter:`urlize` and :tfilter:`urlizetrunc` were subject to a potential
denial-of-service attack via certain inputs with a very large number of
brackets.
CVE-2024-39329: Username enumeration through timing difference for users with unusable passwords
================================================================================================
The :meth:`~django.contrib.auth.backends.ModelBackend.authenticate()` method
allowed remote attackers to enumerate users via a timing attack involving login
requests for users with unusable passwords.
CVE-2024-39330: Potential directory-traversal via ``Storage.save()``
====================================================================
Derived classes of the :class:`~django.core.files.storage.Storage` base class
which override :meth:`generate_filename()
<django.core.files.storage.Storage.generate_filename()>` without replicating
the file path validations existing in the parent class, allowed for potential
directory-traversal via certain inputs when calling :meth:`save()
<django.core.files.storage.Storage.save()>`.
Built-in ``Storage`` sub-classes were not affected by this vulnerability.
CVE-2024-39614: Potential denial-of-service vulnerability in ``get_supported_language_variant()``
=================================================================================================
:meth:`~django.utils.translation.get_supported_language_variant` was subject to
a potential denial-of-service attack when used with very long strings
containing specific characters.
To mitigate this vulnerability, the language code provided to
:meth:`~django.utils.translation.get_supported_language_variant` is now parsed
up to a maximum length of 500 characters.
When the language code is over 500 characters, a :exc:`ValueError` will now be
raised if ``strict`` is ``True``, or if there is no generic variant and
``strict`` is ``False``.